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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to understand the importance of adopting an ethical framework based 
on values in the socio-ethical discussion on nanotechnology and generally on emerging 
technologies. In particular, within such framework it is introduced a distinction between 
two ideal types of science, defined on the basis of their different aims. Such distinction is 
considered to be a useful guide in the ethical debate on the technological development of 
our society, because it may help to understand what are the values of science and their re-
lations with our values as members of the social community. My point is that a reflection 
on the values of science is needed to make scientists aware of their responsibilities as sci-
entists in the society. Once scientists have understood their responsibilities as scientists 
they could be involved in a broader ethical reflection on their responsibilities as citizens. 
Technological development makes sense only if intended as an evolution of socio-
technical systems and it is not possible to make an ethical evaluation of such evolution 
without having established what are our values and our idea of a common good. For these 
reasons nanotechnology should deal with our values, our idea of a common good, and our 
being responsible as citizens. 
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1. Different aims of science 
  
“Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is 
thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been 
declared to be that at which all things aim” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 
Book I). 
Three terms are mostly used in the scientific and philosophical literature 
of nano: nanoscience; nanotechnology; nanotechnologies. The terms 
“nanoscience” and “nanotechnology” are mostly used interchangeably, due 
to the inextricability of scientific and technological research converging at 
the nanoscale 1 . However, nanotechnology/nanoscience are not considered 
                                                        
1 There are obviously some exceptions, as for example Tiefenauer (2006). 
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synonymous of nanotechnologies (plural), nanoindustry and nanoengineer-
ing. 
There are two main types of contrast in the literature between 
nanoscience/nanotechnology on the one side and nanotechnologies on the 
other side: in the first case the contrast is founded on the different goal that 
nanoscience/nanotechnology and nanotechnologies respectively have, and in 
the second case the contrast is founded on the specification of the research 
topic, from a general nanotechnology to many specific applied nanotechnolo-
gies. 
  
Here we have an example of the first kind of contrast: 
  
Nanoscience is the study of phenomena and manipulation of materials 
at atomic, molecular and macromolecular scales, where properties dif-
fer significantly from those at a larger scale. Nanotechnologies are the 
design, characterization, production and application of structures, de-
vices and systems by controlling shape and size at nanometer scale 
(Royal Society & Royal Academy of Engineering, 2004, p. 6). 
 
A distinction is made between nanotechnologies that “design” and 
“product” nano-objects and nanoscience that “studies” and “manipulate” 
nano-objects. As for the second kind of contrast: 
 
Nanotechnology, in the singular, is perceived as a unified program of 
research; an ideograph, a unique scheme of innovation, which informs 
the framing of ethical issues and expectations of these technologies. 
Nanotechnologies, in plural, consist of the applications of this new 
technology within their different contexts, such as, for example, the 
life sciences (‘nanobiotechnologies’) or medicine (‘nanomedicine’). In 
entering these fields, nano can be re-shaped and assumes different 
connotations because it is oriented toward particular goals (Ferrari 
2010, p. 30). 
 
While terms like ‘nanoengineering’, ‘nanoindustry’ and ‘nanotechnolo-
gies’ refer to different levels of application of nanoscience or nanotechnology, 
the terms ‘nanoscience’ or ‘nanotechnology’ refer to a general idea of science 
at the nano level. What is it hidden behind this difference in the use of 
terms? My idea is that behind such different use and perception of terms we 
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can find two different conceptions of technoscience, which can be defined by 
means of their different aims. Looking at the recent history of science, we 
may see that both philosophers and scientists have felt the necessity of mak-
ing some kind of distinction between different concepts of science, like the 
distinction between science and technology, basic science and applied science, 
and so on. 
Popper (1935) made a distinction between pure theoretical science and 
applied science or technology that is still present today in some common im-
ages of science and technology; such distinction was based on the different 
goals that were attributed respectively to pure and applied science: he argued 
that pure theoretical science aims at the discovery and testing of general 
laws whereas applied science or technology aims to use initial conditions in 
conjunction with known laws in order to obtain desired final conditions. 
Agassi (1966) like Popper considered the distinction between pure and ap-
plied science as founded on their different ends; however, he also distin-
guished between applied science and technology, considering the latter to be 
constituted by applied science and other elements like invention and imple-
mentation of the results of both applied science and invention. Skolimowski 
distinguished between science and technology in terms of the concept of pro-
gress, by arguing that “whereas progress in science results from the continu-
ous improvement of scientific theories and consequent enlargement of the 
scientific store, it is a peculiarity of technological progress that it provides 
the means (in addition to providing new objects) for producing better objects 
of the same kind” (Skolimowski 1966, p. 378). 
In the ‘80s the difference between the culture of science and the culture 
of technology was matter of an intensive debate. At that time philosophy of 
science and social studies of science were very interested in understanding 
the differences between science and technology and in analysing their rela-
tions in the innovation process. One of the main issues in the debate was the 
issue of understanding the degree at which technological innovation incorpo-
rates basic science. One of the models representing the innovation process 
was a linear flux from the basic science to the usage, passing through the ap-
plied research: 
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Figure 1. The “six-stage linear model” of the innovation process (Pinch 
& Bijker 1984, modified). 
 
This model stressed a linear relationship between basic research and 
technological development, considered two steps of a common innovation 
process. The linear model failed to represent the different relationships be-
tween basic research and society and between technological development 
and society, because it did not consider the feedback mechanism by which 
the usage of an artefact in a society may influence both basic research and 
technological development. Moreover, such model considered technology 
subordinated to basic research under several aspects: chronological, logical, 
and epistemological. Alternative models like the “interactive model” (Barnes 
1982) suggested an egalitarian and interactive relationship between science 
and technology, where technology was not anymore subordinated to basic 
science. Such kind of model stressed the independence of technology from 
basic science as a discipline that creates knowledge as well, even if a different 
kind of knowledge: a technological knowledge vs. a theoretical knowledge: tech-
nology was considered an autonomous discipline with its own history, its 
own innovation process, and its own relationships with the society. 
In the ‘90s other kinds of contrast emerged, like for example that be-
tween “industrial” and “academic” science: e.g., Ziman (1998) described 
them as two distinct cultures different from a “sociological” point of view, 
where industrial science represented the culture more involved in ethical 
considerations about the personal needs and values of customers, patients 
and other users; such ethical involvement, however, was not at an individual 
level of the single scientist working in the industrial science, but at the level 
of the company leading the industrial research. On the other hand he 
claimed that academic science and scientists working in the academic science 
did not feel any ethical commitment towards the society, neither on an indi-
vidual level nor on the broader level of a community. Today a distinction be-
tween science and technology does not make much sense, given the fusion of 
science with technology; moreover, industrial and academic sciences are not 
so different as they were used to be, if we consider that university laborato-
ries and hospitals are funded by private investors and therefore get a direct 
benefit in investigating a certain kind of issues and producing a certain kind 
of knowledge. The worst constraint to freedom is the selection of knowledge 
based on specific interests. 
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However, my point is that a teleological distinction between two ideas of 
science still makes sense today and could be useful in the ethical debate on 
nanotechnology. I propose the following distinction between two ideal types 
of science: 
  
1.     Knowledge-Oriented Science (KOS) that aims to produce scientific 
knowledge. 
2.  Market-Oriented Science (MOS) that aims to make a profit by produc-
ing artefacts to introduce into the market. 
  
The different aims of these two ideal types of science make them concep-
tually and ethically distinct.  
KOS has the aim of producing knowledge and therefore searches for 
novel methods, objects, functions, mechanisms, and theories. KOS does not 
make any selection of knowledge based on specific interests: in this sense 
KOS is free. 
MOS has the aim of making a profit and therefore produces a profitable 
knowledge by means of searching for profitable methods, objects, functions, 
mechanisms and theories, in relation with the desires and needs of society 
and the rules of marketing: in this sense MOS is not free to search for any 
knowledge, but only aims at a profitable knowledge. Moreover, its products 
do not need to be novel, because MOS just follows the rules of marketing: an 
old scientific product may be sold as a new one, just changing its image or 
some non-essential feature. An example of the fact the there is no necessity 
of novelty for MOS products is well represented by the racial drug BiDil. The 
combination of the active ingredients present in such drug (isosorbide dini-
trate/hydralazine) is known from the ‘80s to treat cardio-vascular diseases in 
humans: however, from 2005, such combination of ingredients in BiDil has 
become specific for blacks, since BiDil has been approved by FDA as a racial 
drug to treat cardio-vascular diseases in African-Americans (Sankar & Kahn 
2005). It is clear that BiDil is only marketing and does not represent any sci-
entific innovation. 
The conceptual distinction between MOS and KOS highlights different 
ideal types of science that co-evolve with society through a reciprocal and 
constant influence. The fact that they are defined by different aims it implies 
that they have precise and distinct values and responsibilities (see e.g. Jonas 
1979). My point is that considering such different values and responsibilities 
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is necessary to establish the role of socio-ethical discussion in science and 
technology from both a conceptual and operational point of view. 
 
  
2. The values of science 
 
“The absence of a commonly accepted definition of nanotechnologies has 
precise epistemological implications, because it influences the setting and le-
gitimisation of scientific research areas and therefore the scope of the re-
search. The setting of goals clearly has ethical implications, because goals 
and aims are shaped by society and because goals are matters of research 
policy—in particular through priority-setting” (Ferrari 2010, p. 30). 
To find a unique and unambiguous definition of nanotechnologies has of 
course a great epistemological and ethical relevance in order to set and le-
gitimate scientific research areas with their specific goals and aims; however, 
I think that a philosophical analysis of the distinction between KOS and 
MOS has a great relevance as well either in the epistemological and in the 
ethical debate. Distinguishing between these two ideal types of science may 
be very useful in particular to the ethical debate about an emerging technol-
ogy like nanotechnology, because emerging technologies attract more pri-
vate interests with respect to non-emerging technologies. The distinction be-
tween the two ideal types of science should be conceived as fluid in the sense 
that it changes in relation to many variable factors, as for example the 
amount of economic interests at stake. What is important to remark is that 
the two ideal types of science are differently related to the values we think 
science should be inspired and regulated by. Consider, for instance, freedom. 
It is evident that both KOS and MOS can claim to be intimately connected 
to the value of freedom. Nonetheless, the particular way they can do it is dif-
ferent - and this difference has crucial and interesting consequences on our 
ethical appraisal of their nature and their position within democracy, soci-
ety, law and the other spheres of collective life. 
Recent interviews made to academic researchers during some experi-
ments of interdisciplinary engagement (Schuurbiers 2011) show clearly that 
they feel that their work should be free of any particular interest. At the 
question whether the society benefits from their research the common way 
of answering was: “I hope so. It’s not my immediate goal; I haven’t thought 
much about it. What I’m doing is basic research; this is probably a little bit 
far away from … What I’m doing is too far away” (Schuurbiers 2011, p. 782). 
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The paper reports a general picture that emerges from such interviews in 
which “the ultimate benefits of research cannot and should not be accurately 
predicted. Participants gave several historical examples of knowledge flow-
ing from basic research that only much later turned out to have practical 
use” (ivi). Another researcher claimed: “If you invest more in society-
improvement, then the learning curve of science will become less steep. So … 
in the end it’s less good for science … And in the end maybe also for society 
… in the long term” (ivi). 
From these interviews clearly it emerges that KOS has a specific rela-
tionship with the value of freedom. KOS’s freedom is expressed, among other 
things, as the absence of a direct and immediate dependence on the societal 
consequences; the aim of KOS should not be to benefit society at first, but it 
should be to produce an unrestrained knowledge; only through the process of 
producing knowledge - indirectly - society will benefit of scientific research. 
Although it is arguable that society will eventually benefit from scientific re-
search, it is a shared image of KOS that it is free in the sense that its goals 
should not be affected by any pressure depending on society and its immedi-
ate needs. In order to ethically evaluate KOS, then, we have to decide what 
we collectively ethically think about this kind of freedom (or, this way of be-
ing free). In fact, such freedom may require some kind of indifference to-
wards society; and our ethical evaluation of KOS must evidently include an 
ethical evaluation of this aspect of its being free. 
While KOS aims to produce unrestrained knowledge, MOS searches for a 
profit: and a profitable knowledge ready to be applied and introduced into 
the society is the means for reaching a profit. Its goal being different, MOS 
cannot be said to be free (or, demanding to be free) in the same way KOS is. 
No doubt that MOS is in principle more concerned about societal needs and 
desires: under this respect, it is more careful about what we need and what 
makes us happy. Its being less free to investigate topics that are not ex-
pected to bring immediate societal positive consequences is indeed required 
by its secondary goal of making us more free, through satisfying more of our 
desires. So after all MOS is related to the value of freedom in a very different 
way with respect to KOS. People working in MOS are free to earn money 
(profit being MOS’ primary goal), and people living in societies affected by 
MOS get free to satisfy a larger number of preferences and needs. How do we 
value these aspects of freedom? Our ethical evaluation of MOS will surely be 
different from our ethical evaluation of KOS. That is why I think that dis-
tinguishing the KOS and the MOS ideal types of science is useful and even 
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necessary in order to develop a clear and consistent ethical evaluation of sci-
ence. And, of course, this is even more compelling for nanoscience and 
nanotechnology, where goal-deriving differences are stressed by fast pro-
gress, huge funding, and business competition. 
Once we admit that ethical considerations vary in dependence of ideal-
typical goals of MOS and KOS, we could nonetheless claim that such ethical 
considerations are trivial. For instance, we could say that what really counts 
is that MOS can benefit society more and faster than KOS. But not all tech-
nological products are a response for some need of society; most of them are 
indeed produced to create a new need (a new cream for wrinkles, a new TV 
system, etc.). And we must discuss whether it is ethically blamable to give 
opportunity to satisfy a greater number of desires or needs via creating new 
desires and needs - even more than those that will be satisfied. This is an 
ethical issue directly regarding MOS, and KOS is only indirectly touched by 
it - as long as KOS may indirectly make MOS and its consequences possible. 
Another fundamental value of KOS that lacks in MOS is the sense of a 
scientific community, the idea of the existence of a network of free scientists 
who collaborate for a final common goal of knowledge. This aspect of KOS is 
well described by Ravetz (1971), when he talks about the factors that char-
acterize the concept of “industrialisation of science” and one of them is the 
loss of a network of “informal and personal contacts binding a community”. 
Competition prevails over collaboration, and the idea of a collective human 
activity disappears. Moreover, for Ravetz industrialisation of science “brings 
into science the instability and the rapid, uncontrolled changes reflecting the 
world of trade and industry in our society”. The idea of a scientific commu-
nity as a community of free scientists who share the goal of reaching a free 
knowledge can be compared with Sandel’s idea of a community of free indi-
viduals who cooperate for the common good (see Sandel 2009). 
Here we have a clear opportunity to see why KOS is rather an ideal type 
than an objective sociological reality. In fact the academic research system is 
not the same thing as KOS - distances from KOS being greater or smaller 
depending on local variances having to do with economical, social, political 
and technological geographical differences. De facto academic scientists do 
compete for funds, laboratories, jobs, teams, chairs, leaderships, visibility, 
publication, prizes, glory, immortality, and many other things. So de facto 
the ideal of a human scientific community struggling for the common goal of 
conquering true knowledge is seldom purely realized. Still this ideal goal af-
fects both their activity and our way of ethically judging it. What I mean is 
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that, for example, we find that an academic scientist who does not collabo-
rate with her colleagues and does not prevent them from taking a wrong way 
in their research is violating some prescriptive norms ideally regulating her 
profession, so that we judge her more ethically blamable than an industrial 
scientist acting in the same way. Of course the problem of private funding of 
academic research is a very delicate point under this respect, considering 
that it also affects the scientists’ freedom. As long as freedom of academic re-
searchers is limited because of the expectations of the private investors, gov-
ernment funding should be strengthened in every country; the academic re-
search system could still benefit of a co-participation of private funding, but 
not the whole amount of the money should come from private institutions. 
On the other hand MOS has the goal of selecting only the profitable 
knowledge, which is the only one that can be applied and transformed in a 
product to be sold. The monetary profit of MOS is meant to be for few peo-
ple and not for everyone. The societal benefit is a secondary and perhaps un-
intentional consequence (Adam Smith and the ‘invisible hand’ debate) of the 
primary goal of profit. Could MOS choose to produce a kind of knowledge to 
improve the quality of life of everyone without producing any income for 
who is paying for the research? No, because the goal of MOS is to make a 
profit. However, an utilitarian may conclude that after all MOS as an ideal 
type - and all its closest realizations - are ethically better than any KOS, just 
because MOS is more likely to maximize general happiness than KOS. A 
communitarian, on the other hand, may argue that KOS is better than MOS, 
for very different reasons. Consequently, the utilitarian and the communi-
tarian would ethically prefer different real scientific groups, enterprises, sys-
tems, organizations and so on. But the reasons why they would differ in ethi-
cally evaluating such real things are much clearer if we firstly understand 
why they differ in ethically evaluating the ideal types of MOS and KOS, and 
secondly ascertain how those real things are close or far from realizing the 
ideal types of MOS and KOS respectively. Using some regulative concepts 
turns out to be very useful for applied ethics - and specifically for nanoeth-
ics. My proposal may also be seen as that of introducing a teleological, goal-
dependent distinction within the well-known notion of socio-technical system: 
such old concept (see e.g., Bijker, Hughes, and Pinchs 1987) is very used to-
day in the literature of social studies of science to stress the impossibility of 
isolating technology from society (see e.g., Johnson 2007; McGinn 2010). The 
notion of socio-technical system emerges from the interactions between 
technoscience and society: by introducing the conceptual framework of the 
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two ideal types of science we must consider the different socio-ethical issues 
emerging from such distinction that influence the change of socio-technical 
systems. KOS and MOS produce different kinds of knowledge that influence 
in a different way the evolution of socio-technical systems. 
  
 
  
Figure 2. The evolution of the two ideal types of science and the socio-
technical systems. 
  
The model2 above sketches the net of the mutual interactions between 
KOS, MOS, and socio-technical systems. Compared to the model of develop-
ing technological knowledge in Fig.1 there is no linear process that produces 
“technological innovation”: the two ideal types of science and socio-technical 
systems participate in a open causal net and co-evolve together. The term 
“evolution” is used here instead of “innovation”, since as I claimed MOS 
does not produce necessarily “new” scientific objects but new products (sold 
as “new” following a marketing strategy) and on the other hand KOS in-
                                                        
2 The model does not aim to represent exhaustively the complex framework of the rela-
tions between KOS and MOS, but it aims to offer a schematic suggestion of the main in-
teractions involved in the “circle” of socio-technical systems evolution. 
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volves a slower process of production than MOS, which for a long period 
could produce no novelty. Moreover, the word “innovation” stands also for 
“progress” and it is not straightforward today individuating what is a socio-
technical system progress: socio-technical systems are complex structures, 
and the idea of progress of socio-technical systems supposes some high-order 
goal the whole process is aiming to. But there is no guarantee that any more 
recent socio-technical state is objectively better than any older state, or that 
any more recent human lifestyle made possible by technological develop-
ment is objectively better than any older lifestyle, and so on (MacKenzie & 
Wajcman 1999; Sandler and Kay 2006; Johnson 2007). We would need to fix 
some objective evaluative measure, which is highly problematic. We can of 
course say that, relatively to a particular point of view or interest or prefer-
ence, some process is an improvement. But assuming that particular point of 
view or interest or preference is clearly not required. The same holds for 
natural evolution, where we can say that human beings are “better” than 
amoebas just if we agree to assume some particular point of view. The word 
“evolution” is therefore appropriate because the is no necessity of advancing 
to a better state, and also because it signals for the complexity of any cul-
tural evolution, in this particular case an evolution that also involves proc-
esses of adaptation of society and/or its parts to new technological opportu-
nities and vice versa. In such evolutionary process KOS and MOS are not 
separate paradigms that do not communicate to each other; they are in-
volved in reciprocal interactions and are both embedded in complex cultural 
processes. 
Considering the interactions between KOS and MOS, on one side, and 
society, on the other side, there are of course many ways in which such in-
teractions could deploy. How can society affect KOS and MOS? There ap-
pears to be a continuum between cultural, ideological, soft, bottom-up kinds 
of affections on one hand, and legal, coercive, hard, top-down kinds of affec-
tions on the other hand. The latter typically occur through regulation, ban, 
moratorium, permission, deregulation; the former take place via cultural 
change. If we focus on the softer, cultural ways in which society can influ-
ence the direction of socio-technical evolution by affecting KOS, we can 
stress at least two main possibilities: 
1) Influencing models, hypotheses, concepts. Science is a human activity 
and therefore it is embedded in the cultural and social context (Kuhn 1962). 
Society can affect its shape and contents, its problems and urgencies, its di-
rection and development. 
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2) Influencing a re-conceptualization of science with specific aims and 
values. Society can transform science by changing our ways of thinking of it 
- included our ways of conceiving our values and seeing the relationships be-
tween our values and KOS, by means of realizing, neglecting or violating 
them. Such an influence takes place on multiple levels: politics, institutional 
discussion, media, habit change, etc. 
Similarly, society has some different options in order to shape the direc-
tion of socio-technical evolution by affecting MOS on the softer and cultural 
end of the continuum: 
1) Making choices about the usage of the products. Society can make 
choices about the usage of objects that could change the market and conse-
quently the directions of MOS. 
2) Influencing our relevant values, and the ways we see the relationship 
between our values and MOS. This has a feedback on how scientists working 
in MOS conceive themselves, too. The general location of MOS in our moral 
view of human activities, and the capacity of MOS to auto-regulate is at 
stake. Another point is how similar to the scientists operating in KOS the 
scientists working in MOS feel to be. 
The development of nanotechnology may be made responsible only 
through the active participation of the society. The direct participation of the 
society in the socio-technical evolution involves today activities of multidis-
ciplinary engagement for scientists and the public. Such activities are not in-
tended in a negative way, to limit or control nanotechnological innovation. 
Otherwise, they are intended in the positive sense of “preparing” the public 
to receive such innovation and of improving in scientists the awareness of 
the socio-ethical implications of their work. 
1.   Public Engagement (PE) activities. Within the emerging framework 
of discourses regarding social and ethical issues of scientific research and the 
relationships between science and society, in the last years the figure of the 
public entered into the “Societal Dimensions” component of the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) in the United States, which has the 
achievement of linking “basic science” to “societal benefits”. Such entrance 
has been accompanied by an emphasis on activities related to “public under-
standings of nano”, “cultivating public trust”, and “public interaction and 
outreach” (see e.g., Viseu & Maguire 2012). While one part of PE should in-
volve people in an active participation and discussion about the values of 
science, another part should involve a reflection about their needs and values 
as members of the society. To realize such kinds of participation is not an 
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easy and quick process and certainly is not a process people can do without 
the help of scientists, philosophers, sociologists, and historians. 
2. Scientist Engagement (SE) activities involve scientists in a discussion 
on the socio-ethical consequences of their actions. Since the ‘80s the sphere 
of social responsibility of scientists includes a critical reflection on the socio-
ethical context of their work (see, e.g., Verhoog 1980; Ziman 1998). Firstly 
scientists must feel responsible for what they do everyday in the laboratory; 
they should be able to evaluate the societal relevance of their research; then, 
they must feel part of the society not as scientists, but as members of the so-
cial community. Therefore, one aspect of the ethical engagement of scientists 
consists in an ethical reflection of their work and in improving the sense of 
an “internal” ethics in the form of a set of ethical norms and principles that 
are considered necessary to be a “good” and “responsible” scientist; they 
must understand their part as scientists in changing the society. The second 
aspect, more complex, consists in “making” scientists citizens who feel the 
responsibility to contribute with their actions to the common good. Scien-
tists must feel part of a broader moral community, the social community; 
only if they feel members of such community they will begin to understand 
that to be involved in the socio-ethical debate is their responsibility exactly 
as the public, that being involved in such debate is a matter of care and not 
an obligation (see e.g., Puig de la Bellacasa 2011). SE projects should work 
hard in this direction, since it seems the only way we could dissolve the di-
chotomy between science and society, or science and public. According to re-
cent interviews (i.e., Viseu & Maguire 2012) most scientists believe that it 
should be the public to reflect on socio-ethical issues of technology, because 
such issues are outside the realm and responsibility of “proper” science: “Sci-
entists can give you answers and can give you options, but it’s really up to 
the public to decide what’s the correct course” (Viseu & Maguire 2012, p. 
200). Other interviews (i.e., Schuurbiers 2011) reveal that several scientists 
think that it also is up to the public to decide about what research topic 
should be investigated (and funded): “politicians are the voice of the people, 
and those are the ones that automatically decide who gets the money, be-
cause they should have, they should know, what people want. So if people 
want cleaner fuels, then they give money to cleaner fuel. If people wanted 
better dogs, than they would find someone else. I think it’s driven like that” 
(Schuurbiers 2011, p. 783). Again, I think the ideal-typical distinction be-
tween KOS and MOS is useful to face the general problem of shaping PE and 
SE activities. 
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3. The relationship between science and society: making science trust-
able  
 
I want to focus on three requirements for the future relationship between 
science and society, which nanoethics should care about. The first require-
ment is making science trustable. 
In order to promote an active role of the society in the evolution of 
socio-technical systems we need a transparent and trustable science: a trans-
parent and trustable science can be reached with a co-operative open net-
work between laboratories in which step by step reports of the experiments 
and periodical reports of the directions of research are mandatory. Such re-
search network must link every laboratory in the world. In this way we 
would promote the transparency required for a good communication be-
tween science and society and a right development of the scientific commu-
nity. Laboratories would have to share not only favourable results but also 
unfavourable results; such precise request has been already formulated sev-
eral years ago by physicians for clinical trial registration: 
 
Altruism and trust lie at the heart of research on human subjects. Al-
truistic individuals volunteer for research because they trust that their 
participation will contribute to improved health for others and that 
researchers will minimize risks to participants. In return for the altru-
ism and trust that make clinical research possible, the research enter-
prise has an obligation to conduct research ethically and to report it 
honestly. Honest reporting begins with revealing the existence of all 
clinical studies, even those that reflect unfavourably on a research 
sponsor’s product. Unfortunately, selective reporting of trials does oc-
cur, and it distorts the body of evidence available for clinical decision 
making (DeAngelis et al. 2004). 
 
Sharing unfavourable results is an important value in science which is 
specified in KOS’s goal of searching for any kind of true knowledge: profit-
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able and non profitable, favourable and unfavourable, advantageous and 
disadvantageous. The choice to select only some kind of knowledge and to 
hide another part considered non convenient for private interests is morally 
blamable because any knowledge may contribute to scientific progress. It is 
evident in the case of clinical trials because, as pointed out by DeAngelis et 
al., it represents an egoistic and dishonest behaviour towards all individual 
volunteers who decide to participate because they trust that their participa-
tion will contribute to improve other people’s health and that researchers 
will minimize risks to participants. It is less evident why it should be consid-
ered morally blamable in science in general, but we may suspect this is so 
only because we are not used to reflect on the values of science; again, the 
distinction between KOS and MOS is helpful to clarify what such values are. 
If we establish that a community of free scientists who search for a free 
knowledge is what we think science should be, to share unfavourable results 
in scientific practice becomes highly morally relevant. Being a KOScientist 
brings precise responsibilities, and to publish both favourable and unfavour-
able results of a research represents one of these responsibilities. Indeed the 
moral requirement of sharing favourable and unfavourable knowledge is 
part of our concept of KOS. This is a moral requirement that every KOSci-
entist should match. 
Of course the same does not hold for MOS. Although it would be obvi-
ously a good thing that a network be built among KOS laboratories in order 
to share knowledge, we would not say that a MOScientist who does not care 
about that is as morally blamable as a KOScientist. The reason is that we 
think that MOS has different intrinsic goals. In other words, MOS is intrinsi-
cally less trustable than KOS. 
So it is not easy to make MOS trustable, because MOS only searches for 
profit; MOScientists are not free and can hardly feel individually responsible 
for what they do, because their work is subordinated to some higher business 
plans. How to solve the problem of trustability in MOS? I think that MOS 
must be periodically controlled by specific public institutions; through such 
control procedures the State would make a pressure towards transparency of 
the whole decision-making process inside MOS, with the final aim of making 
MOScientists free to be individually responsible as their KOS colleagues. 
However, making scientists free to be responsible is not enough, since both 
KOS and MOScientists are not trained for understanding moral issues re-
lated to their work: they also need to be helped to get more responsible. 
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4. The relationship between science and society: making scientists responsible 
The second requirement I want to stress is making scientists responsible. 
Indeed we all should agree that “technological revolutions are consti-
tuted by significant technological progress; technological progress enables 
comfort, ease, health, longevity, security and wealth; therefore, technologi-
cal revolutions are social goods” (Sandler & Kay 2006, p. 675). And dealing 
with social goods requires a responsibility that goes beyond the responsibili-
ties that scientists may have as scientists: it requires a responsibility as citi-
zens. 
Today many SE projects have the precise aim of promoting interactions 
between science and society, like for example the STIR project3, and many 
sociologists and philosophers have developed different approaches aimed at 
enhancing the socio-ethical dimension of research decision making, as for ex-
ample, approaches to stimulate the “ethical imagination about the future” 
of researchers (Van der Burg 2009), approaches that use co-evolutionary 
scenarios (Robinson 2009), biographical narratives (Consoli 2008), ethical 
parallel researches (Zwart et al. 2006), and trading zones (Gorman et al. 
2004). Engaging in different ways scientists in the socio-ethical debate will 
increase their sense of responsibility and will make them aware of what are 
the questions they should ask themselves in the everyday work in the labo-
ratory. The idea is that a scientist should be trained to understand the socio-
ethical side of its everyday decisions on experimental design. At the same 
time, a scientist should be familiar with a broader reflection on socio-ethical 
issues related to the role of science in the society. This within-lab work will 
help scientists to develop a reflexive awareness of the immediate ethical im-
plications of their decisions and will reinforce the interactions between the 
public, scientists, sociologists, and ethicists. 
The topics discussed in the STIR studies (see i.e., Schuurbiers 2011) are 
chosen to enhance a self-reflection on the work of a scientist in the everyday 
scientific context of the laboratory. Mainstream Modulation (MM) frame-
work represents one of the most known form of STIR and it has been devel-
oped and applied in a pilot study by Fisher & Mahajan (2006) with the aim 
                                                        
3 The Socio-Technical Integration Research (STIR) project is a NSF-funded project con-
ducting a coordinated set of 20 laboratory engagement studies to assess and compare the 
varying pressures on – and capacities for – laboratories to integrate broader societal and 
philosophical considerations into their work (Fisher & Guston 2008). 
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of testing and enhancing the capacity of researchers to integrate the socio-
ethical context in their decisions: “As a policy instrument, midstream modu-
lation (MM) is a means of incrementally influencing a technology during the 
“midstream” of its development trajectories. It thus asks how research is to 
be carried out, which is within the purview of engineering research, rather 
than whether a research project or product should be authorized, approved, 
or adopted, which is largely beyond the purview of engineering research” 
(Fisher & Mahajan 2006, p.3). MM can address immediate concerns of 
worker safety and exposure and can identify opportunities to impact longer 
term outcomes by means of studying the nature of researcher decisions in the 
context of the laboratory itself; however, such approach - as declared by 
Fisher & Mahajan (2006) - has not the aim of addressing the nature of socie-
tal concerns. May an approach that does not aim to stimulate among scien-
tists a reflection on issues related to the nature of societal concerns be suffi-
cient to reach the aim of shaping technological trajectories? I think it may 
not. MM framework lacks of a crucial aspect regarding a broader socio-
ethical perspective in the debate on emerging technologies, which I do not 
think should be considered “beyond the purview of engineering research”, as 
claimed by Fisher & Mahajan (2006). 
In particular, the questionnaire in Schuurbiers 2011 - inspired by the 
MM protocol - is articulated in two main categories of questions: micro-
ethical questions regarding the reflection on safety rules within the research 
system, which are very specific (e.g.: “why are you wearing plastic gloves 
now?” (ibidem, p. 775)), and macro-ethical questions regarding the reflexion 
on the research system, which are very generic and embedded in a pure cost-
benefit framework (e.g.: “does your research benefit society?” (ivi)). Among 
macro-ethical questions there are also epistemological questions like: “would 
you say scientific facts describe the world as it is?” (ivi). I think that such 
work certainly represents a first necessary step for scientists to reflect about 
very short term safety, ethical, and social aspects of their decisions in the 
experiments, however it lacks to involve scientists into the current debate on 
the impact of emerging nanotechnology in the society not as scientists but as 
members of the society, as citizens. In other words, current experiments of in-
tegration of societal considerations into and during nanoscale engineering re-
search preserve the dichotomy between science and society and by focusing 
on practical concerns about risk and safety they forget to care about more 
fundamental values of our society. These limits are both caused by the cost-
benefit and risk ethics framework adopted in the current debate. Such per-
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spective represents the real limit for a “responsible innovation” of nanotech-
nology. 
If we consider for example the issue of freedom of science, in Schuurbiers 
(2011) scientists are pushed to reflect to the fact that academic science is not 
free because funded by private investors. While it is certainly necessary to high-
light this aspect, no reflection about the value of freedom of science has been 
stimulated by the interviewers. Such interdisciplinary works should stimu-
late scientists to reflect further about their idea of science, their idea of free-
dom in science, and other values of science. The approach used in the ques-
tionnaires weakens the ideal views of scientists instead of enhancing them. 
Scientists should be stimulated to re-think about KOS, MOS, and the scien-
tific community in the Ravetz’s sense of a network of free scientists who aim 
to produce new knowledge. It is a result to be obtained both at an individual 
level and at an institutional level by enhancing public funding to academic 
research. For a long time science has been embedded in a matrix of non-
scientific institutions, but this fact should not be an excuse to forget what 
the values of KOS and MOS actually are. My point is that scientists are not 
stimulated to reflect about the reasons why they say that science should be free 
and in which sense they think this freedom should be preserved. The distinc-
tion between KOS and MOS may help scientists to reflect on these points. 
I think that this issue of MM framework has to be considered just as an 
example of a way of thinking about ethics, science, and society. A virtue eth-
ics would work much better than a cost-benefits ethics in order to make sci-
entists responsible at an individual level of what they do every day in their 
laboratories. The goal of influencing scientific and technological develop-
ment can be reached only outside of a cost-benefit ethics; such goal can be 
pursued only by making scientists feel as citizens within a social community 
who reflect on their values and their idea of the common good. Therefore, 
the topics of the discussion in the STIR project studies should include 
broader issues like the following: what are the values you would like to preserve 
for the future generations? Should every member of the social community be in-
volved in making the common good? What do you think may be your part as a 
member of the social community? Does your belonging also to the scientific com-
munity make you more responsible than any other member of the society? 
Only this kind of discussion will make possible a critical dialogue on 
socio-ethical issues of nanotechnology in KOS and MOS. The socio-ethical 
discussion on the responsibilities of scientists as citizens may involve scien-
tists in a deep ethical reflection on the difference between individual and so-
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cietal benefits, and between benefits and common good of the social commu-
nity: such concepts are very different and to understand such difference is 
fundamental in order to attribute a significance to the concept of well-being. 
While issues related to responsibilities of scientists as citizens are exactly 
the same in KOS and MOS, we could expect that the concept of responsibil-
ity as a scientist is not embedded in the same way in the MOS and KOS con-
text of work. In fact, even once we have made MOScientists free to be re-
sponsible during their work as well as KOScientists, still there is the problem 
of the lack of the value of scientific community in MOS. It is quite evident 
that the fact of knowing to belong to a community naturally reinforces the 
sense of responsibility. 
Recent interviews reveal that scientists either think that it is not their 
job to reflect on socio-ethical issues or think that a reflection on such issues is 
already part of their work in the laboratory, just because they consider 
safety and toxicology issues while they are working (Viseu & Maguire 2012). 
It is obvious that reflecting about safety and toxicology issues is very impor-
tant for a scientist, but it is also obvious that it represents a very small part 
of the whole socio-ethical reflection on the responsibilities of a scientist to-
wards the society. 
A broader reflection on the socio-ethical issues in nanotechnology should 
also take in consideration the current discussion on the “environmental val-
ues” in ecological economy, the field that studies the relations between eco-
nomic choices and the environment in order to achieve a coherent vision of a 
sustainable development of the future (see e.g., Funtowicz & Ravetz 1994; 
Howarth & Farber 2002). Ecological economy investigates on the ways for 
embedding in the economic cost-benefit analysis the contributions of the en-
vironment to human well-being and the costs that a depletion of natural 
capital imposes on future generations; by searching for appropriate indica-
tors of the welfare provided directly by the environment, ecological economy 
tries to establish the environmental values and the costs of the environ-
mental changes. What is our willingness to pay in relation to willingness to 
accept a compensation for environmental changes? 
Besides the immediate relevance of this kind of research topic in the 
socio-ethical debate on nanotechnology, there is a more basic question 
emerging from the discussion in ecological economy, which we should con-
sider when dealing with nanotechnological choices that may have relevant 
impacts on the environment. I am talking about the question whether we 
should associate quantifiable values to ecosystems or - in other words - 
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whether we should establish a price for the environment. Among others, 
Sagoff (1988) claimed that environmental systems are connected to “core so-
cial values” that cannot - or should not - be reduced to monetary terms. For 
Sagoff to give a price to the environment is a mistake. He claims that con-
sumer-product and environmental problems cannot be solved by giving a 
price respectively to the “commodities” of product safety and environmental 
pollution: these two goods do not belong to the market and should not be 
treated as commodities. Sagoff considers some goods of our society not 
evaluable by means of the methodology and the concepts used in economy: 
social regulation should reflect community-regarding values that every indi-
vidual as citizen has to respect. Sagoff’s idea that environmental values are 
misplaced if traded in the market can be extended on several goods like San-
del does in a recent book (2012) where he claims that to give a price to a 
good that should not have a price and therefore should not be in the market 
it “corrupts” that good in the sense that it changes its value. Pearce (1993; 
1995) argued against the idea that environmental systems can be considered 
as market benefits and therefore an evaluation of them should be linked to 
the concepts of willingness to pay for non-market benefits or willingness to 
accept a compensation for non-market costs: environmental systems provide 
material and experiential benefits that contribute directly to human well-
being, and are associated to fundamental values of humankind. Nonetheless, 
every day economical decisions are made that are able to change our envi-
ronment and therefore the environment must be considered in the economic 
decisions by introducing concepts that help evaluating the benefits for future 
generations provided by maintaining the structure and functioning of eco-
systems, even when such benefits cannot be quantified in economic terms. 
Therefore, even if we do not want to consider the environmental change as a 
commodity to buy/sell in the market, we could still try to evaluate the rela-
tionship between our values, our idea of well-being, and the environment, in 
order to influence the direction of the evolution of “socio-environmental sys-
tems”. Decisions about any human action have to be made only in relation 
of human values that are not necessarily linked to societal benefits but nec-
essarily with the higher moral concept of common good. 
All these considerations clearly play an important role in the decisions 
about the direction of scientific research and technological development, but 
they also help us to understand the changing of values and the “rationality” 
of a technological society (see e.g., Queraltó 2013). In the investigation of 
socio-ethical issues related to emerging technologies we should consider all 
LUDOVICA LORUSSO 
 
 292 
the interactions between socio-economic, socio-environmental, and socio-
technical systems; moreover, we should study what are the values linked to 
these systems and how they change. 
All such systems and their interactions should be investigated by means 
of a multi-disciplinary approach, using insights from sociology of technol-
ogy, innovation studies, history of technology, evolutionary economics, eco-
logical economics, etc. in order to imagine future scenarios and ethically re-
flect on them. A multi-disciplinary approach can be found in Geels’s work 
(2005), where a multi-level perspective is described, based on insights from 
sociology of technology and evolutionary economics: such multi-level per-
spective shows a substantial co-evolution between technology and society in 
the transition towards piped water and personal hygiene: the idea is that any 
socio-technical transition in the history is the product of a co-evolution of 
technology and society that involves technological innovations, such as 
piped water infrastructure, soap, toilets, baths, as well as cultural, political, 
economic and behavioural changes. 
A multi-level perspective should also face the issue of clarifying the sig-
nificance of concepts like well-being and should work on a reflection on the 
ways science may improve such well-being (see e.g., Alexandrova 2012). In 
this framework we should also promote a debate about the concept of societal 
benefit within the concepts of scientific and social community both in SE and 
PE activities. Sure the concept of benefit is strongly related to the concept of 
well-being and dependent on the culture considered. For example, consider 
the society of American women consumers, and an imaginary nanotech-
nological product that makes people tanned in just 5 minutes. For sure such 
product will likely be considered a benefit by such kind of society and maybe 
such society will be inclined to undertake the risk of using such product, in 
particular if who sells the product undertakes the risk. If we now look at the 
society of Chinese women consumers - which traditionally considers to be 
tanned unaesthetic - such society will probably not judge such product to be 
a benefit and will not be inclined to undertake the risk of it. A reflection here 
has to be made about the fact that it is not so evident what it is a benefit 
and for whom. What is a “benefit” depends on what society I am consider-
ing. Which society? The society of US consumers? The society of rich US 
consumer? The society of all human beings, consumers and non-consumers? 
By depriving science and society of values it is easy to loose control over 
the socio-technical development. It is too easy to claim that nano-products 
are among us and therefore we have to learn how to interact with them. The 
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diffusion of nano-artefacts must be controlled by means of a concrete reflec-
tion on our ideas of well-being, benefit, needs and values. MOS tries to intro-
duce in our imaginary the idea that nanotechnology will be “a revolution in 
quality of life” (see e.g. Shelley-Egan 2010), that nanotechnology will change 
everything we know of the world today; why this should be a good thing? 
Will this new quality of life be better in the sense of being more desirable? 
By the way, will it be desirable by the major part of us?  
Today two main issues related to the introduction of new nano-artefacts 
into the market are 1) the issue of distributive justice about the distribution 
of new artefacts (the issue of the nano divide): will this new quality of life be 
reachable by everyone? and 2) the aspect of safety, risk, and control: the in-
troduction of new artefacts in the market is under examination because of 
potential risks involved: for example, the REACH initiative in the European 
Union – the “Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemical substances” – represents one of the first effort to regulate the in-
troduction of artefacts into us and our environment (see e.g. Robison 2011). 
My claim is that there is too much focus on the way the “new quality” of life 
will be distributed and on the costs in terms of risks related to such new 
quality: few people focus on the significance of such quality and risk with re-
spect to our values. We cannot establish what is an improvement in our 
quality of life and what represents a risk if we do not fix first what are our 
values. 
Finally, in SE activities a deeper reflection on the dependence of KOS on 
societal institutions is needed, in order to understand how freedom in aca-
demic research can co-exist with a private system of funding. Of course the 
dependence of science from the institution is not a new thing: “The depend-
ence of science on government, the role of organizational constraints, and the 
intermingling of scientific and technological problems create multiple reward 
structures which have consequences for the social and cognitive development 
of science. The technical system, a centrally-administered network of actors 
oriented toward the solution of a set of related technological problems, is 
proposed as a concept which reflects this embeddedness” (Shrum 1984, p. 
64). However, it seems that nanotechnology - for its being perceived as so 
novel a science, surrounded by many industrial interests - is bringing a new 
relevance to this old issue; in a recent paper Simakova (2012, p. 611) explores 
how a discussion on sociology of expectations regarding emerging technolo-
gies may contribute to shaping the future of socio-technical systems by 
means of considering moves between the categories of “basic science” and 
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“industrial relevance”: “The faculty on campus are enmeshed in a complex 
web of policies of intellectual property rights and ethics (conflict of interest) 
committees, the terms of which change from year to year. Articulating 
which entities were involved in regulatory work - funding agencies, govern-
ment, industrial partners - entailed judgments upon the capacity or desir-
ability of those entities to participate in the governance of nanotechnolo-
gies”. 
 
 
5. The relationship between science and society: eliminating false beliefs 
 
The third requirement for nanoethics should be eliminating false believes. 
What do scientists believe about the role of technological evolution real-
ized through socio-technical systems? They believe that technological evolu-
tion tends necessarily to promote the common good (see e.g., Sandler & Kay 
2006). I have shown that this is a false assumption for MOS, because MOS 
aims to make a profit and we cannot assume that its products will necessar-
ily improve the common good. What about KOS? Even KOS cannot prom-
ise to improve the common good, because new knowledge could bring to 
socio-technical systems that are not necessarily good or that could yield both 
good and bad consequences. It is therefore a false belief to assume that tech-
nological evolution will tend necessarily to the common good. The elimina-
tion of such false belief is necessary to understand the need of a discussion on 
our values in relation to scientific and technological evolution.  
What do scientists think about the possibilities of improving the interac-
tion between society and science? 
 
The biggest problem is that people don’t know enough science. And 
that’s a big problem. And I want to talk to people about science so I 
really encourage people to take more science. So I’m an educator. I be-
lieve in that. I believe firmly that […] an informed public can make 
the best decisions about what’s important, and these questions about 
what gene tools to take, what bioterrorism methods to use… Scientists 
can give you answers and can give you options, but it’s really up to 
the public to decide what’s the correct course. So right now in the de-
bates, you name it, on stem cell research, on abortion, and all these 
things, quite often, it’s the lack of scientific knowledge that is limiting. 
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It is the [lack of] generic scientific knowledge of the public that is lim-
iting our ability to do a good job (Viseu & Maguire 2012, p. 200). 
  
Many scientists believe that a positive influence of society on scientific 
development can be reached only if the public knows more science. I think 
that this is another false belief. Scientists believe that because they belong to 
a complex societal paradigm in which this is the common way of thinking. 
Consider for example the NNI in the United States, which has the goal of 
promoting a development of nanotechnological research that benefits the 
citizens; NNI does its job by “preparing” the public to receive such new 
technology and by “educating” the public, instead of focusing in making sci-
entists responsible (see e.g., Sandler & Kay 2006).  A general scientific knowl-
edge does not count very much because the socio-ethical debate is about our 
values and our idea of common good. Such debate involves all people as citi-
zens - therefore it should not be intended as a debate of scientists (the “ex-
perts”) vs. public (the “non-expert”) or even of scientists (the “non-experts”) 
vs. nanoethicists (the “experts”); consider for example they way several re-
searchers think about such debate with nanoethicists as an unfair fight: 
“Tennant [Director of Operations, Cornell NanoScale Facility] describes the 
actual engagement in SEI [Social and Ethical Issues] as an uneven playing 
field where scientists are at a disadvantage because of their lack of training” 
(Viseu & Maguire 2012, p. 203). 
To think that the debate needs an educated public could make sense in a 
framework in which it is possible to calculate the immediate effect of the in-
troduction of a new technology in our world, but this is not possible for 
nanotechnology. From one side the problem is that we are not able to imag-
ine the risk involved in such kind of technology; from the other side, how-
ever, there is the fact that to make a prevision of how a technology will 
change a society is never possible and therefore the knowledge of that tech-
nology represents only a small part of the story and what it mostly counts is 
represented by the knowledge of our values. Of course, it is not a bad thing 
to know more about science, but it is not relevant in order to establish the 
responsibilities of science and the directions of science and technology neces-
sary for a “good” development. Scientific knowledge is important but subor-
dinated to the awareness of what are our values and our common good. To 
increase the generic scientific knowledge of people it does not help in know-
ing more about our needs and values. Moreover, often we could hear scien-
tists to claim that the public gets “emotional” about emerging technologies 
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and that their emotions represent a limit to the technological progress. 
Maybe it is true that many people are scared about unknown negative conse-
quences linked to experiments and products of emerging technologies; how-
ever, it is also true that the way MOS is selling the unknown positive conse-
quences of emerging technologies by means of introducing fashionable prom-
ises (see e.g., Swierstra & Rip 2007; Shelley-Egan 2010) is “beyond reason” 
as well, and aims exactly to get people emotional about such kind of un-
known positive consequences. Consider for example the following quote 
about some of the promises of nanotechnology according to Philip J. Bond, 
US Under-Secretary of Commerce: “reducing or even eliminating pollution 
through clean production technologies; repairing existing environmental 
damage; feeding the world’s hungry; enabling the blind to see and the deaf to 
hear; eradicating diseases and offering protection against harmful bacteria 
and viruses; and even extending the length and the quality of life through 
the repair or replacement of failing organs” (Swiss Re Centre for Global Dia-
logue 2005, p. 7). Therefore, what is the “best irrationality” to be followed?  
What is necessary for the public to communicate with science is not sci-
entific knowledge, but understanding to be part of the same community. 
Scientific knowledge is considered necessary only because we still use a 
framework of the ethics of risk, where ethics is reduced to a cost-benefit 
analysis (see e.g., Dupuy 2007). We believe that there exists a risk that can 
be rationally calculated, exactly like in ecological economy we think about 
the possibility of establishing a price for the environment: by assuming the 
validity of such framework we have to think that scientific knowledge is nec-
essary to reason on socio-ethical issues of nanotechnology, because an 
evaluation of the risk requires knowledge. As long as we remain prisoners of 
the ethics of risk framework we will not reduce the distance between science 
and society: changing the ethical framework is a necessary step to reduce the 
number of those scientists who think that it is not their business to care 
about socio-ethical issues and finally to promote an ethically-informed evo-
lution of socio-technical systems. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
I have analysed relevant aspects of the relationship between science and so-
ciety realized through PE and SE activities. Certainly such activities repre-
sent fundamental instruments to construct a good communication between 
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society and science, a way of rethinking about our values and needs; instru-
ments to reconsider the ethical framework in emerging technologies. Inter-
disciplinary approaches are important in 1) making the process of decision 
shared and responsible in KOS and controlled in MOS; 2) reasoning about 
values and responsibilities of KOS and MOS; 3) reasoning about the hierar-
chy of values and needs for us and future generations. However, PE and SE 
do not represent the only way of influencing and controlling the evolution of 
socio-technical systems. 
In 1980 David Collingridge said about the difficulty of controlling tech-
nology: “Attempting to control a technology is difficult, and not rarely im-
possible, because during its early stages, when it can be controlled, not 
enough can be known about its harmful social consequences to warrant con-
trolling its development, but by the time these consequences are apparent, 
control has become costly and slow” (Collingridge 1980, p. 19). 
Interestingly, Collingridge claims that the reason of the “technology’s 
resistance to control” is the “entrenchment”: “The adjustment of other 
technologies to one which is developing, so that eventually control of the lat-
ter is only possible at the cost of re-adjusting the technologies which sur-
round it” (Ivi, p. 47). Similarly to the Duhem-Quine thesis (Duhem 1906) of 
the impossibility of falsifying isolated hypotheses, Collingridge sees in the 
networks between old and emerging technologies the reason why an emerg-
ing technology may not be controlled. The concept of “entrenchment” offers 
itself as a useful concept, but needs to be analyzed with a full understanding 
of the social processes and the evolution of socio-technical systems. Tech-
nologies are meant here to constitute a complex network in which to isolate 
one single technical object it is not possible: “Technology in its various mani-
festations is a significant part of the human world. Its structures, processes 
and alterations enter into and become part of the structures, processes and 
alterations of human consciousness, society and politics” (Winner 1977, p.6). 
Winner thinks about the technological process introducing the idea of “ad-
aptation”: adaptation of technological systems, in which every system, ob-
ject, process, structure, material that does not find part in the human world 
is eliminated. He claims that beyond a certain level the technological devel-
opment becomes a self-generating, self-perpetuating, self-programming 
mechanism and human ends become adapted to suit the technological devel-
opment. 
Such images of technology and technological development highlight the 
importance of the influence of our choices in the everyday life and of the cul-
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tural transmission of our values in shaping the direction of the evolution of 
socio-technical systems. This is the most fine and efficient form of control-
ling technological development.  
Finally, the distinction between KOS and MOS will help all of us to con-
sider different ethical questions about science:  
1.     What should be the values of science? 
2.     What should be the aims of science? 
3.     What are the individual responsibilities of scientists? 
4.     How should science meet societal challenges, needs, and values? 
In order to answer these questions we should 1) change the sense of par-
ticipation of scientists to the socio-ethical debate in the sense of making 
them feeling part of a broader moral community that is the social commu-
nity and 2) go beyond the framework of the risk. As Dupuy (2007) claims, eth-
ics should not be reduced to “prudence” in the sense of a rational manage-
ment of the risk.  
What is a risk in an action involves a discussion of the impact of such ac-
tion on our values. In order to evaluate the impact and the willingness to ac-
cept such impact we need to make projections of the future. Any ethical con-
sideration about introducing new objects into the environment potentially 
dangerous for the humankind and the environment itself should include an 
analysis of the hierarchy of values of our society. We cannot let any member 
of our society introduce products in the market that have unknown conse-
quences on our health without having established first whether this is what 
we need according to our values. We should first think about our values: the 
knowledge of what are our values undermines the scientific knowledge con-
sidered nowadays necessary in order to participate to the socio-ethical de-
bate on emerging technologies. The concept itself of sociotechnical systems 
makes sense only in an ethical framework based on values. Talking about 
risk is important but what is a risk depends of how we imagine our future 
should be. There is no risk assessment without having established what are 
our values. 
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